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BOOK REVIEWS
Christianity and Philosophy, by Keith E. Yandell. Grand Rapids, Michigan:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1984. Pp. xi and 289. $12.95.
JAMES A. KELLER, Wofford College
Yandell's book is a sustained attempt to show that religious claims can be
rationally assessed. He does this primarily by assessing many such claims, though
he also discusses how religious claims should be assessed (chp. 4) and provides
some rules for assessing conceptual systems (chp. 8). The religious claims on
which he focuses are those of theism, a position which he defends. Thus, his
book is secondarily a defense of theism, though one he regards as inconclusive.
It covers a broad range of topics at a sophisticated level yet with economy of
style; though written clearly, it is not a book for beginners. It includes many
valuable insights and useful arguments on a variety of topics, making it worthwhile even for those with some knowledge of the philosophy of religion.
The book's concerns (both topics and methodology) are those of recent philosophy of religion in the broadly analytic tradition. Yandell shows familiarity with
recent work in that tradition, but he almost never refers explicitly to it, preferring
instead to discuss various positions as options or possibilities without identifying
explicitly any advocate of the position or anyone articulation of it. To some
extent, he compensates for this absence of explicit reference through a bibliography at the end of each chapter, but these bibliographies are too brief to provide
a good introduction to even the current literature and consist predominantly of
works by Christian authors and/or by authors sympathetic to Yandell's positions.
Perhaps this is due to the book's membership in a series (Studies ill a Christian
World View) "intended for thinking Christians who are attempting to articulate
a Christian world view in contrast to current non-Christian world views." The
book has no index, but instead each chapter has a very helpful analytical table
of contents.
Yandell's defense of the rational assessibility of religious claims and of theism
has two parts. Since God (if God exists) is a particular object and the concept
of God is essential to a complex conceptual system, assessment of God exists
will involve consideration of purported experiences of God (numinous experiences) and consideration of the conceptual system. He expresses the connection
between the parts with an analogy: "As the overall plausibility of a scientific
theory which refers to a theoretical entity x is relevant to the question of whether
to describe experimental observations in terms of seeing an x, thereby providing
confirmation for There are x's (the phenomenology of the experience also being
relevant), so the overall plausibility of theism is relevant to the question of whether
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to describe numinous experiences as experiences of God, thereby providing
confirmation for God exists (the overall phenomenology of the numinous experience being relevant)" (42). The first chapter defends the positive evidential value
of numinous experiences; the remainder of the book is concerned with discussions
relating to the overall plausibility of theism without reference to numinous (or
any specifically religious) experience.
Topics covered in the remaining chapters include traditional arguments for the
existence of God, the purported ineffability of God, skeptical and relativist
attacks on the rational assessibility of religious claims, the rational assessibility
of moral claims, the problem of evil, Yandell's proposal for a theistic ethics,
and some rules for assessing conceptual systems. Yandell's overall conclusion
is that though these discussions do not constitute conclusive evidence for theism,
they do show it to be in "good epistemic position" (284).
One might evaluate the book either in terms of its claim that religious claims
can be rationally assessed or in terms of its arguments for theism. The entirety
of the book is a sustained argument for the claim about rational assessibility.
On this level, in one sense it succeeds very well. In light of the great variety of
considerations which it adduces about many central religious claims, one would
be very hard pressed to deny that religious claims can be rationally assessed, at
least to some extent. But this would probably not satisfy many relativists or
skeptics. Unless they were positivists, they probably would not deny that some
considerations could be given pertaining to the truth or falsity of religious claims;
rather, I suspect that they would simply say that these considerations are woefully
underdeterminative of the truth of all the contenders and of falsity of at least
most of the contenders for the religious allegiance of mankind. Some of the
considerations Yandell employs (and the rules he gives) are satisfied by all the
contenders, and whether others are satisfied is so highly controversial as to make
it impossible to show that one particular conclusion on the matter is clearly better
justified than all others. Nothing Yandell has said or done in this book refutes
this criticism. Indeed, he himself admits that "for anything that has been argued
here ... various views incompatible with theism also may be in good epistemic
position" (284). Of course, the only way to put this objection to rest would be
to produce an adequate justification of Christian theism (or some other system),
and it is hardly fair to fault Yandell for not doing so, particularly in a book
which does not attempt to do so. But unless we at least come much closer to
doing so, we shall not have refuted (this sort of) skepticism and relativism. And
the skeptical and relativist challenge gains even more force when one realizes
that not only are we unable to show that only one system is clearly in good
epistemic position, but we are often unable to show that a particular conclusion
on any major consideration which bears on the overall issue is in any better
epistemic position. Space does not permit arguing for this latter claim, though
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it is worth noting that Yandell himself admits that his discussion of most of the
issues in his book is not conclusive. But the difficulties in reaching justified
conclusions on these matters contribute to the difficulty in showing that one
conceptual system, in contrast to all the others, is justified. Yet showing this is
required to make an adequate response to the challenges of skepticism and
relativism.

Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of
Stages, by Stephen N. Dunning. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
323 pp. + vii. $32.
C. STEPHEN EVANS, St. Olaf College.
Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness is an original, well-written study of Kierkegaard as a dialectical thinker. Dunning's book is a direct challenge to the
thesis of Niels Thulstrup (in Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel) that Kierkegaard
owes virtually nothing to HegeL Dunning thinks that Kierkegaard's work "lends
itself' to a systematic, structural analysis. Despite the fact that the content of
Kierkegaard's work is so often anti-Hegelian, Dunning tries to show that the
form of Kierkegaard's work is Hegelian or at least similar to Hegel. Of course
from a Hegelian standpoint, at least, the relation between form and content
suggests that the opposition to the content of Hegel's philosophy may not be so
absolute and unqualified as many have thought.
Dunning recognizes that there are different kinds of dialectic. He wishes to
focus specifically on the type of dialectic exemplified in Hegel, with three
characteristic "moments." The first moment is one characterized as "in-itself,"
and generally connotes immediacy and externality. The second, or "for itself'
moment, is associated with reflection, inwardness, and negativity. The third or
"in and for itself' moment, is supposed to resolve the tension between the first
two by incorporating their "truth" and suppressing what is partial and one-sided
in each. This third moment then begins the cycle anew.
After an initial look at The Concept of Irony as an illustration of what is meant
by dialectical thinking, and as evidence that Kierkegaard was trained in this kind
of thinking, Dunning embarks on an analysis of the theory of the stages on life's
way, as this theory is exemplified in the pseudonymous authorship from Either-Or
to the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. In typical Hegelian fashion Dunning
finds tripartite structures within tripartite structures. The three stages are understood in Hegelian fashion. Each stage in tum is analyzed as consisting ofthree-fold
movements. Movements are in their tum analyzed as composed of moments, and

